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30 NOV 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Comments on Terms of Reference for
NIE 11-14-78

1. My apologies for taking so long to get at this one. My comments are as follows:

a. If this is a compromise "middle ground," I still think it is extremely ambitious to accomplish by April. More power to you. Charge off!

b. As a former flank commander, I'm concerned at the several passing references to the flanks. This is not that I want to give particular attention to them. It is that I think the problems on the flanks are so distinct from the rest and I see so little flavor of that distinctiveness (i.e., large naval character) in the rest of the outline that I am concerned. I do not propose that you divert the study into a major view of the naval picture on the flanks. I simply do not think it would be wise to portray this as a view of the flanks if we are going to treat it cursorily. Even in its ground and air aspects, the situation on the two flanks varies considerably from that in the center. In short, either be prepared to do a credible job on the flanks which almost turns this into three separate studies, or acknowledge that you are treating the center with reference to the fact that some level of forces will be allocated to the flanks and therefore not available to the fighting on the center.

c. I am particularly interested in the air campaign analysis. This alone could be a prodigious study. I would refer you once more to my enthusiasm for a Mitre study of this very topic done several years ago. The US Air Force

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claims it is out of date but I commend to you the methodology employed in it and even the possibility of getting Mitre to update it. In particular, I am concerned that we take into account such things as:

(1) Operational availability vs. fewer inventory numbers.

(2) Cycling and repair capability to maintain a sortie rate.

(3) Requirements of Pact pilots to be under positive air control?

(4) A sequential look at all of the actions that would have to be successfully undertaken in order to take a weapon from a Pact airfield to a NATO target, i.e., aircraft is available; it penetrates through its own air defense zone; it penetrates through the NATO air defense zones; it overcomes NATO electronic warfare; it locates the target; it penetrates target point defenses; it releases its weapon with sufficient accuracy to find the target; the weapon impacts as designed.

(5) As you know, Secretary Brown is conducting a study on sustainability and is particularly anxious for our input. The work of this study will be a major help. One simple calculation I would suggest is: in accordance with US doctrine, what quantities of principal logistic support would be required to sustain the forces we are hypothesizing the Pact would employ; from what we know of the Warsaw Pact doctrine on logistics, how would the Pact calculation differ from ours; in both cases what combination of stockage in the theater and transportation flow-through would be required to provide that level of logistic support; on a pure volume basis, and assuming that it is all filled, how does the estimated forward area stockage compare with that requirement, and how does the road and rail and air pipeline compare with the flow-through requirement?

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(6) In chapter III you have a title "Radio-Electronic Warfare". I have never seen this term before. There is a great deal of confused terminology in the electronic warfare field. I would like to make sure we are not compounding it. If this is a readily accepted term in the military circles--fine; if it is something we have concocted, I would prefer that we stick with accepted definitions. Moreover, it would be advisable to list those definitions at the beginning of any such discussion.

2. I will call Admiral Weinert and see if we can get him to participate.



Stansfield STANSFIELD TURNER

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